It is no exaggeration to say that the difficulties of establishing an information infrastructure have been grossly underestimated by those involved. Coupled with unrealistically high expectations about future benefits, this has created a lot of frustration. What is lacking is a better developed sense of the nature of these socio-technical difficulties together with suitable concepts for framing them. The notion of inscriptions seems to us to be a promising vehicle for achieving this. It helps unravel the complexity, both technical and non-technical, which needs to be curbed in order to establish a working information infrastructure.
On the strength of an inscription
Granted that technological artefacts never fully determine patterns of use, the issue is really to what extent a specific artefact in a given context inscribes a certain behaviour. Analytically viewed, the strength of an inscription relies on three aspects: the size and complexity of the surrounding actor-network which is linked to the inscription, the degree to which it is aligned with this surrounding actor-network and the strength of the inscription on its own.
The notion of the strength of an inscription offers a different handle on grand, at times dogmatic, issues such as "empowerment", "politics" of artefacts, or the debate over technological vs. social determinism. Rather than, say, inquiring whether information systems have or have not "politics" on a fairly general basis (Winner 1993; Woolgar 1991), the interesting question -which a notion like the strength of an inscription helps tease out -is to describe the extent to which inscriptions in a given case actually succeed in disciplining use. 1 From this point of view, to talk about the "politics" of an artefact is nothing but a convenient shorthand for a situation where the strength of the inscriptions of the artefact in question is very strong.
When analysing large technical systems like information infrastructures, it is difficult to keep track of the contributions from the various components, that is, the constrains mediated by the and Euclides' influence on the work in CEN (section 5.2). In both cases, the small actors' power was the result of, first, their alliances with existing, technology (Fearnley Data's implementation of the EDIFACT message and the Euclides system respectively), secondly, alliances with nontechnological actors involved in the standardisation work (KITH, Statskonsult and European Medical EDI in Edgar Glück's case and key people in CEN and the Commission of the European Community in Euclides' case).
Beyond actor network theory
We have so-far embraced actor network theory. Not all aspects of our case fits well with the theory, at least not the minimalistic version we have presented so far. In Latour's example illustrating the concept of inscriptions, the processes is driven and controlled by a manager having a clear intention, consciously experimenting until the program of action is imposed on the hotel guests. Inscriptions are different means of enforcing the same scenario. For instance, the sign at the door and the knob on the key are two alternative inscriptions with the same, well-defined scenario in mind, namely to get the guests to leave their keys at the desk. The hotel manager, in Latour's pedagogic example, combines and tests these inscriptions in a goal-directed manner.
This example fits well into the kind of "managerialism" (or centred, privileged view) which actor network theory has been accused of (Harraway 1988 , Law 1994 . In several of our examples, however, this intentional behaviour is difficult to find. Our case illustrates that more often than not no one had a clear sense of the complexity of the actor-network. As a result of this non-trans- Other scholars have made related observations. Bowker, Timmermans and Star (1995) argue that there are always several, alternative actor-networks, never only one. Berg's (1995) notion of localisation of rationale also frames this process of stumbling, negotiating and refining the scenarios as one goes along. Ciborra´s (1996) notion of "drifting" and Orlikowski's (1996) notion of "improvisation" similarly point in the direction of unanticipated consequence, stumbling and opportunistic choices. Although never thematised as such, Hughes (1983) account of the development of an infrastructure for electricity contains numerous examples of the same. incapable to market their solutions to users. The statement from EDIFACT cited in (Graham et al. 1996 , p.10, emphasis added) illustrates how problems are down-played and benefits are exaggerated: "It should be understood that the benefits of having a single international standard outweigh the drawbacks of the occasional compromise".
The belief in universal solutions combined with the blindness for the intricate links and interactions between technical and non-technical elements of the actor-networks creates standards of complexity that their development proceeds very slow and close to impossible to implement. If they are implemented, however, the size and complexity of the actor-networks make them rather irreversible and irresistible as their inscriptions are strong. Our empirical material is limited in its documentation of whether inscribed programs of action really are followed by the users. We think this is generally true as individual users cannot decide how to use networking technologies by their own, it has to be agreed upon by all communicating partners.
The diffusion, in line with (Graham et al. 1996) , has been very slow. The non-standardised lab message systems developed and adopted by users in the period 1987 to 1992 are still in use although their further diffusion has stopped. The installations of systems based on standardised lab messages seem to be used as described by the scenarios worked out as part of the standardisation work. Similarly, the EDIFACT messages implemented adhere to the practice inscribed into the actor-network constituting EDIFACT technology. There is no implementations of the standards based on re-interpretations of some of the design assumptions. Dr. Fürst's lab consider implementing a systems providing services beyond what can be offered by a standardised one as being too difficult at the moment. This would require cooperation with other actors, and establishing such an arrangement is too difficult as it is based on an anti-program compared to that inscribed into the standards.
Micro actors in a macro world
Standardisation is usually taking place at international levels. It is a world of large companies (telecommunication operators and manufactures), international standardisation bodies and political institutions like the European Union, national governments and ministries and the United Nations. The actor-networks are difficult to grasp, control and change. And alignment of one standard with an existing actor-network is very slow. Controlling the standardisation process and its outcome is hard. If anybody has any kind of control, it is the professional standardisation people. In our case this means the EDIFACT mafia. It similarly makes the process more open to improvised and opportunistic choices (Ciborra 1996; Orlikowski 1996), for instance, the way the drug depot got enrolled in the prescription project as a result of the -surprising -discovery that their drug list was an important material for inscriptions.
Still, this lack of control gives small actors opportunities to mobilise support for their proposals and having strong influence on the process and its outcomes. In our case, this is illustrated by the influence of Edgar Glück and Fearnley Data concerning the definition of a standardised message for lab information and the development of a health care information infrastructure in Norway. scheme as no "global" identification coding scheme exists. This makes the drug depot's earlier situation a lot more vulnerable. To the project leader, the drug depot has stated that they now are willing to let give general practitioners free access to their drug list (Yang 1995). During 1996, the provider of applications for the pharmacies, NAF-Data, has been setting up a data base for all distributors of drugs in Norway including the drug depot. This data base is intended to be made accessible to the general practitioners. It has been decided that a new institution will be established and delegated the responsibility for giving each drug its unique identification number.
Discussion

The emerging picture of information infrastructure standardisation
As pointed out earlier in sections 3.1 and 3.2, there is a wide variety of information infrastructure standards produced within bodies ISO/CEN, EDIFACT, and Internet Society. These standards are on different levels and deals with issues like message definitions, syntax specification, protocols, file type formats, etc. Some standards are general purpose, others are sector specific ones (for instance, health care), and some are global while others are regional. Most of them are currently in-the-making (cf. section 4). Our study does not provide evidence for drawing far-reaching conclusions regarding all types of information infrastructure standards. We believe, however, that the health care standards we have studied are representative for crucial parts of the standards of the information infrastructures envisioned in for instance the Bangemann report (1994) , and that the picture of standardisation emerging from our analysis contains important features. We will here point out some main characteristics.
The primary characteristics of standards is that they are not neutral, technical specifications but large actor-networks including systems architectures, message definitions, individual data elements, standardisation bodies, existing implementations of the technology being included in a standard, users and user organisations, software vendors, text books and specifications. Programs of action are inscribed into every element of such networks. To reach agreement and succeed in the implementation of a standard, its whole actor-network must be aligned.
The experiences from standardisation of information exchange within health care indicate that the actor-networks constituted by standards easily grow unmanageable complex. A striking feature is the extent to which the socio-technical problems of establishing an information infrastructure have been underestimated or are unanticipated. The massively dominant approach to date has been met with surprisingly few objections. The heritage from telecommunication standardisation and information modelling (cf. section 5.1) is evident in the thinking and actions of the EDIFACT mafia. It was, for instance, simply "obvious" that problem of developing lab messages in Norway should be translated from acquiring practical experience from situations of use in Norway to aligning the specification with perceived European requirements. The EDIFACT mafia had a gatekeeping role which allowed them to define the problem. And their definition of the problem was accepted. Proponents of alternatives (for instance, Profdoc´s bar codes) was register over drug producers and pharmacies in Norway. The catalogue is printed once a year, while additions regarding new or obsolete drugs are printed and distributed continuously. The "Common Catalogue" is produces by a publisher (Fabritius) and was recently available also electronically in the form of a CD-ROM. This solution based on the "Common Catalogue" delegates a very different set of roles to the involved actors. The required integration work between the electronic medical record system and the prescription module would now involve the publisher but neither the pharmacies nor the drug depot. Besides simply pointing out a, technically speaking, perfectly feasible alternative to a solution based on the drug list from the pharmacies, Profdoc also had a more self-centred interest in promoting it. During the period after the preproject was completed, Profdoc had a series of meetings with the publisher of the "Common Catalogue." Profdoc explored the possibility, independently of the prescription project, to integrate their medical record system with the "Common Catalogue." They had never taken pro-active part in the prescription project (cf. section 5.6). When the issue of drug identification number surfaced, they apparently seized the opportunity of trying to design a solution delegating a role for themselves and their allies in the prescription project.
The alternative suggested by Profdoc was not pursued in the main project. Instead, the project continued to work on how to make the drug list available. This soon turned out to be a lot more complicated than they imagined. The heart of the matter was that the list belonged to an actor outside the project, namely the drug depot. As the list contained information which was confidential, for instance about profit margins on pharmaceutical products, the drug depot had commercial interests in it and refused to hand it over free of charge. Hence, the attempts to accumulate strength for the inscriptions demanding that general practitioners provide the drug identifier were faced with serious, unforeseen problems. It was necessary to translate the commercial interests of the drug depot, a non-project actor, into an inscription. This would involve inscribing roles and obligations for (at least) the following issues: how to obtain the list from the drug depot, how to "wash" the list to make it appropriate for use for general practitioners, who should do -and pay for -the work. The fact that the participants in the project had to finance their activities themselves, made negotiations difficult. The problems with working out an agreement with the drug depot dragged on. In a coordination meeting in January 1994 it was stated that an agreement was to be reached.
Late in 1995, the testing of the system for electronic transmission of prescriptions started at a pilot site (one general practitioner and one pharmacy). In this first version of the system, drugs are identified by their ordinary brand names. Employees at the pharmacy will map this name to its identification number manually. When the name is incomplete or misspelled, as it is assumed quite often will be the case, they will call the general practitioner by telephone. This version will not be used for reiterated prescriptions either.
Due to the European Economical Area treaty, the earlier monopoly status of the drug depot has been dismantled as of 1. of January 1995. This paved the road for several distributors of drugs to pharmacies beside the drug depot. Each would have their own drug identification number The pharmacies´ interests for improved logistics was accordingly translated into a proposal to include this six digit drug identifier into the electronic prescription message. This way of inscribing their interests into the semantics of one data element in the message was proposed by the representative of the pharmacies early in the pre-project (KITH 1992) 1 
.
No one seems to have objected to this proposal from the pharmacies despite (or may be because of) the fact that the scenario of use which was inscribed was not spelled out in any detail. In particular, the pre-project did not spell out exactly how the general practitioners should provide this drug identification number when making a prescription. The general practitioners do not make any use of this number. They identify drugs by their type or brand names, not their identification number. It is not feasible to increase the workload of general practitioners by demanding that they provide the identifier manually. In that case, electronic transmission would require more work than the paper prescriptions and the general practitioners would have no incentives to change.
Rather than working out a detailed program of action, the representative from the general practitioners´ associations suggested that this somehow could be solved if the general practitioners were granted access to the list of drug identifiers the pharmacies had, the list maintained by the drug depot. Gaining access to this list was appealing to the general practitioners for two reasons.
Besides the drug identifiers, the list contains other information useful for the general practitioners such as prices and synonymous drugs. The fact that the list is continuously updated was also considered favourable. When the pre-project ended in 1992, what remained was to translate the general practitioners´ interests in accessing the drug list into a suitable (but unspecified) inscription and align this with the already agreed upon inscriptions in the prescription message. In actor network theory terms, the inscription which demanded that general practitioners provide the drug identifier was to be strengthened by aligning it with a larger (but unknown) actor-network inscribing access to the drug list for general practitioners.
The proposals from the pre-project (KITH 1992) were circulated for comments. Profdoc, the sceptical vendor of electronic medical record systems (cf. section 5.6), was also critical to how the issue of drug identification numbers should be solved (Profdoc 1993). The solution Profdoc suggested was to extract the identification number from another source, the so-called "Common Catalogue" (Norwegian: Felleskatalogen) instead of the pharmacies' drug list. The "Common Catalogue" is a paper based catalogue which all general practitioners have. It contains information about all registered drugs in Norway including their identification number. In addition, it contains information about treatment of acute poisoning, drugs that interfere each other, and a tals the ordering general practitioner may have left work and a new one has taken over the responsibility for the patient when the result arrives. In these cases, the result should include the order information as well. If this information is not available, the general practitioner may try to guess (which in many cases would work pretty well), or call the lab and ask them.
The arguments against including the order information are the increasing complexity and size of the messages and message specifications it leads to. One proposal put forth was to send the order as a separate message when needed. This solution needed a reference in the result message to its corresponding order message to avoid confusion. Such references, however, are not a part of EDIFACT as it is used. Technically, it would be very simple to find a working solution. The problem was that it would not follow the "rules of the game" of defining EDIFACT messages. It worked against deeply inscribed practises of specific ways to use EDIFACT. Accordingly it was ruled out. It was instead decided that the order information could be included in the result message.
These examples illustrate that the inclusion or not of a data element in a standard is an negotiation over which programs of action should or should not be inscribed into the standard. In these negotiations, EDIFACT acts as a powerful actor in the sense that most alternatives are close to the intended and customary way of using EDIFACT.
Accumulating the strength of an inscription
In section 2 we explained how, according to actor network theory, inscriptions have to be linked to larger actor-networks in order to give them sufficient strength. Exactly what it takes to make an inscription strong enough is not possible to know beforehand, it is a question of practical trial and error. A program of action is inscribed into an increasingly larger actor-network until the necessary strength is reached. This aspect of actor network theory is nicely illustrated, we believe, by the attempts presented below to inscribe a desired behaviour of general practitioners into the definition of the semantics of one single data element in the prescription message. The question, then, is how to accumulate enough strength for this inscription to actually enforce the desired behaviour of general practitioners. Most examples presented above in a similar way illustrate how EDIFACT inscriptions have accumulated its considerable strength.
A principal reason for the interest in prescriptions from the point of view of the pharmacies was the prospect of improved logistics by integrating the existing electronic ordering of drugs from the drug depot (Norwegian: Norsk Medisinal Depot) (Statskonsult 1992; KITH 1993a). To exploit the economically interesting possibilities of establishing this kind of just-in-time distribution scheme, there had to be a way for the pharmacies to uniquely identify a prescribed drug with the drug which subsequently was ordered from the drug depot. In the electronic ordering of drugs from the drug depot, the pharmacies made use of an existing drug list with a coding scheme for drug identifiers as a six digit article number. tain kinds of treatment. The system is based on a data format specified without using any standard. It resembles the non-standard solutions for exchange of lab reports. Why, then, did this system resist the EDIFACT network? The primary explanation, as we see it, is that the system was specified and implemented by a rather small group of actors. There was no strong competition among these, neither about the possibility of selling a product to a large market nor acting as gatekeeper. Accordingly, nobody needed to mobilise and enrol standardised technology, like EDIFACT, as an ally to strengthen their position.
The message as a material for inscriptions
An important part of the definition of standardised messages is deciding which data elements should be included in the messages and which should not. These elements are also material for inscriptions.
In the system Dr. Fürst laboratory developed, only basic result data were included. The Health Level 7 message used later on as a prototype, included more information. Reflecting the organi- Based on use scenarios worked out in the Norwegian lab messages working group during 1991-92, it was concluded that the data set in the Health Level 7 message did not satisfy the needs (KITH 1991). The message proposal was distributed together with a request for comments. It was, however, decided that economic information should not be included in the first official message standard for reasons of simplicity. This was controversial. The association of pharmacies, for instance, expressed in their comments that the areas of use should be expanded to include information exchange between labs, general practitioners and institutions outside health care such as social insurance and banks.
In some European countries, the patients (through the general practitioners) pay part of the costs of the tests, but not in Norway. For this reason, the price the general practitioners pay for each test is included in the European report message. The general practitioners are invoiced periodically. The price information is important in order to control that the amount they have invoiced is correct. Accordingly, the European standard message include this economic information, and so does the Norwegian subset.
Another open issue was whether the information in a lab order should be included in the result message as well. Usually the result is returned to the ordering physician knowing the order specification already. Accordingly, in most cases the order information would be unnecessary. In some situations, however, the result is returned to another general practitioner than the ordering one. This is the case in ambulatory care, where the general practitioner visiting the patient orders a test while the result should be returned to the patient's ordinary general practitioner. In hospi-Norwegian (Ellen Brox) became the leader of this group. She was well acquainted with the work of KITH. As international standardisation activities concerning prescriptions are modest, she suggested for the EDIFACT group that the message specification developed by KITH should become the basis of a new, international EDIFACT standard for prescriptions. During the autumn of 1992 this was submitted as a so-called "request for new message" to EDIFACT under the name MEDPRE. It received the so-called status 0 on 1. of March 1993, less than half a year after KITH worked out the initial specification. Soon afterwards, KITH worked out an implementation guide for MEDPRE status 0 for use in Norway (KITH 1993a). The fact that the results of the pre-project so quickly -and surprisingly -gave rise to an international standard, was decisive for the so-far unresolved issue over the three alternatives mentioned above. Among these the last one was adopted, that is, to use MEDPRE, their "own" message, in the next phase of the project.
The results from the pre-project, (KITH 1992) together with the implementation guide (KITH 1993a), were circulated to the participants to those involved in the Norwegian efforts for commenting before proceeding with the main project. Reactions varied greatly. The comments from the vendors of electronic medical record systems were particularly important as they were vital to enrol to make an integration of electronic prescriptions and the general practitioners' existing systems feasible. The two largest vendors expressed quite different attitudes.
One (Infodoc) embraced the idea. As they already had some experience with similar work in Sweden on electronic prescriptions, they were favourable. They expected to be able to integrate a prescription module with their medical record system relatively quickly thus giving them a leading edge on competitors. The other principal vendor of medical record systems (Profdoc), however, was quite hostile in their comments (Profdoc 1993). Their comments were questioning the very idea of electronic transmission of prescriptions. They demanded that the scenarios should be spelled out in more detail in order to make the usefulness more visible. This appeal for a delay may be seen as a translation of their primary interest of opposing the project. They furthermore maintained that among their user group of general practitioners there was only modest interest for electronic prescriptions. This vendor also pointed out the alternative based on bar codes which "died" so quietly at the outset of the project (ibid.). The way the objections of Profdoc were neglected indicates the extent to which the EDIFACT mafia was able to function as a gatekeeper in defining the problem as strictly one of standardisation of messages.
Peaceful life outside the network
The limits to where EDIFACT should be used were continuously negotiated despite the agreement on adopting EDIFACT as the overall model. In a different but related case, a system for transmission of so-called "waiting list data," it was decided not to use EDIFACT (Søtorp Holm and Wølneberg 1995). The decision was taken by the project's steering group headed by Bjørn Engum, director at KITH and in charge of the Norwegian standardization activities. This system was to help maintain a central data base containing information about patients waiting for cer-with international standardisation bodies, it reduces the number of involved actors to a minimum and it relies on well-known, mature technology only. However, every general practitioner needs a bar code printer. The bar code solution, it seems, was never considered in detail despite the fact that a similar idea had been experimented with in Sweden.
Another alternative to EDIFACT was suggested by the health insurance authorities. It inscribed a different role for the pharmacies and a different behaviour for the patients. This differences were indeed the very motivation for their suggestion as it supported their economical interests.
The health insurance authorities proposed an architecture where prescriptions were stored in a data base instead of being transmitted directly to the pharmacies. The important behaviour which is inscribed in this architecture but not in the one based on pure EDIFACT messages, is that the pharmacies should retrieve the prescriptions only when the patient actually arrives at the pharmacies. This entail that the health insurance authorities no longer would pay for prescriptions which never actually get picked up. According to the health insurance authorities, this represents a substantial loss. The data base solution would also inscribe a different patient behaviour, namely the freedom for the patient to choose herself which pharmacy to visit to get the drugs. This is particularly important for reiterated prescriptions.
Despite several alternatives, the prescription project never seriously considered deviating from an EDIFACT message based solution in line with predominant conceptions on politically correct standardisation strategies. The project was effectively enrolled in the network of the EDIFACT mafia, where solutions not being in close correspondence with their ideology are rarely implemented.
Still, in many respects the adoption of EDIFACT was coincidental. It was partly a result of the fact that no one had a clear conception of the dramatic increase in complexity involved in the EDIFACT actor-network (cf. section 5.3) and partly that a window of opportunity was opened to promote the Norwegian standardisation efforts internationally.
There were essentially three alternatives for a basis of the prescription message considered by the pre-project: (i) the EDIFACT message for exchange of orders, with the name ORDERS, which seemed appropriate as a prescription might be viewed as a kind of order; (ii) an EDIFACT message for prescriptions developed in Denmark, but without being approved by any standardisa- The pre-project led by KITH did not decide initially whether to base prescriptions on an existing EDIFACT message or to work out one themselves. Only after the pre-project had started did one become aware of an effort within the message design group devoted to health care within the EDIFACT standardisation body at the European level which was looking at prescriptions. A system. It would also greatly support the reports the general practitioners send to the health insurance authorities, some of them being the basis for their payment. More importantly, however, electronic prescriptions were viewed as an element of the association of general practitioners' ongoing programme on quality assurance (cited in Pedersen 1996). Electronic prescriptions allow automatic cross-checking to be performed (for instance, that all fields are filled in properly). The general practitioners were also attracted by the prospects of getting access to the pharmacies' drug item list. This list is provided to the pharmacies by their provider of drugs through the pharmacies' application supplier (NAF-Data). The list contains information useful also for the general practitioners, for instance, about price and synonymous drugs. It is updated on a monthly basis. As we will spell out in more detail in section 5.9, this list turned out to become the source of much controversy.
A key challenge in the prescription project was to find a way to align the interests of the involved actors, most importantly the pharmacies and the general practitioners. According to actor network theory, this takes place by translating these interests and inscribing them into a material (cf.
section 2). This drug item list play the role of such a material. Today, the list of drugs accessible to the general practitioners medical record system is either manually entered and updated or is provided through the vendors of medical records systems at a substantial cost.
The irreversibility of EDIFACT
The activities concerning prescription were more formally organised as a pre-project in the autumn 1992, lasting for three months. It built upon the work done by KITH for Statskonsult (KITH 1992 ) and aimed at working out a message specification and an implementation guide.
The pre-project was financed by NAF-Data, the provider of applications for the pharmacies.
Only three actors with immediate interests were represented: the association of general practitioners, the association of pharmacies and KITH (which was delegated the responsibility for coordinating Norwegian efforts).
The choice of a standardisation model was not given from the outset. The general Zeitgeist, however, was that of working out as universal and open standards as possible as explained earlier for lab communication (cf. sections 5.1 and 5.2). Adopting EDIFACT as the basis for electronic prescriptions seemed inevitable even though alternatives were proposed. These alternatives inscribe quite different interests and delegate completely different roles and competencies to involved actors, especially the EDIFACT mafia. We present two of these alternatives that did not have strong enough inscriptions to work against the irreversibility of the EDIFACT actor-network.
Kleven (1992), a representative of one of the vendors of electronic medical record systems (Profdoc), suggested early on that one should use bar codes instead of electronic messages. This inscribes a scenario where the general practitioners, using a special printer, produce a bar code tag which they stick on to the paper prescription which the pharmacies read using a bar code reader. This solution is dramatically simpler that an EDIFACT solution: it needs no coordination for the general practitioners and their patients. They have so far judged EDIFACT technology too complex and inflexible and intends to wait until simpler and more flexible technology is accepted. 1 Web technology might fulfil the technical requirements for such technology, but this remains to be seen.
Aligning interests
The idea of electronic transmission of prescriptions grew out of a feasibility study as part of Statskonsult´s Infrastructure programme. This area was also identified as an interesting one in Telenor´s Telemedicine project (cf. section 5.1) (Statskonsult 1992). Establishing an infrastructure for electronic exchange of prescriptions requires the alignment of a wide range of different interests, including general practitioners, pharmacies, patients, the government and social insurance offices.
Unlike lab messages, there has up till now not been much done on an international level regarding electronic prescriptions. The effort in Norway we report on accordingly represents an early attempt to standardise prescription messages. As will become evident further below, the institutional arrangements of the standardisation process which link national and international efforts tightly, have resulted in a proposed, international standard for prescriptions heavily influenced by the Norwegian project.
The overall objectives of Statskonsult´s Infrastructure programme was to improved productivity, service quality, and cost containment in the public sector. Spendings on pharmaceuticals are high, and accordingly an important area for cost containment. In addition, the health care authorities wanted enhanced control concerning the use of drugs by patients as well as prescription practices of physicians concerning habit-forming drugs.
The interests of the pharmacies were primarily improved logistics and eliminating unnecessary retyping of information (Statskonsult 1992). By integrating the system receiving prescriptions with the existing system for electronic ordering of drugs, the pharmacies would essentially have a just-in-time production scheme established. In addition, the pharmacies viewed it as an opportunity for improving the quality of service to their customers. A survey had documented that as much of 80% of their customers were favourable to reducing waiting time at the pharmacies as a result of electronic transmission of prescriptions (cited in Pedersen 1996).
As part of the Infrastructure programme KITH worked out a preliminary specification of an EDI-FACT message for prescriptions (KITH 1992) . The pharmacies also wanted to include information about so-called bonus arrangements (Norwegian: frikort) into this message. Certain categories of patients get (up till 100%) bonus on their drugs. This bonus is subsidised by the health insurance authorities on the basis of special reports from the pharmacies.
The interests of general practitioners in the project had different sources. Electronic prescriptions would eliminate retyping a lot of information which already was stored in the medical record 1 . Interview with IT director Sten Tore Fiskerud, Feb. 1996. different places on the form, including one adhesive label that is to be removed from the order and glued on the specimen container. In addition, the paper order is connected to the specimen container. Reproducing this level of security in the scenario when the order is transmitted electronically has turned out to be rather challenging, and will certainly include the design of specific technological as well as organisational arrangements. The design of a solution for lab orders invariably involves the alignment of the complete heterogeneous network of the collection of associated work routines as well as computer systems.
A possible solution that has been discussed is using a collection of label producing machines (bar code printers), label reading machines, manual routines and new computer applications. Each time an order is filled out, a bar code label will be printed by the general practitioner's system and subsequently glued to the specimen container. The unique number represented by the bar code is also a part of the specimen identifier in the order message. When the lab receives a specimen, a machine must read the bar code on the label and ensure that the specimen is attached to its proper order (already received electronically by the lab). The standardised message will inscribe the working routines for instance, the kind of information necessary for carrying out the control routines depends on how these routines are defined. However, as the general practitioners do not have any obvious advantages from electronic ordering, it is reasonably to expect that they are not interested in investing in bar code printers and other technological components these proposal demands. 
Enrolling the general practitioners
Labs have an economical interest in receiving orders electronically as they could save a lot of labour intensive registration work. The ordering general practitioners, however, do not enjoy the same kind of immediate and tangible advantage. In order to enrol the general practitioners, electronic transmission of lab communication needs to translate the interests of the general practitioners´ into the system. So far, this has not been resolved. Several attempts are being made, some of which will be presented here.
A crucial aspect of ordering tests is to ensure that an order and the specimen it belongs to are not mixed with others. A procedure followed by some general practitioners and labs today is the following: Each copy of the paper order is given a unique number. This number is printed on two of messages and message elements; a hierarchy of standardisation bodies on global, regional and national levels; prevailing conceptions and established practices for how to define and implement messages; an EDIFACT industry of vendors and consultants; artifacts like manuals, documentation and educational material about EDIFACT.
The size and complexity of this network make its inscriptions strong and difficult to work against when one is enrolled into it. We will first look at programs of action related to the standardisation process of EDIFACT, then we turn to patterns of use inscribed in the EDIFACT technology itself.
EDIFACT technology and the organisation of EDIFACT standardisation processes make it virtually impossible for users to be involved in, not to say influence, the standards. They are controlled by a group of more or less professional standardisation people who work for large companies or bureaucracies. Inspired by MacKenzie´s (1990) notion of the "gyro mafia", this group may be dubbed the "EDIFACT mafia". This mafia's control is neither a feature of the EDI-FACT format itself nor the organisation of the standardisation process, but it is a result of the interplay between the elements of the EDIFACT actor-network outlined above.
An unintended consequence of the complexity and non-transparency of the EDIFACT actor-network is that it inscribes barriers on end-user involvement through its requirements on the level of competence. To be involved in the standardisation work, one needs to know all the rules of the game -the technological details of EDIFACT, the formal rules of the standardisation bodies as well as all the informal practices. There are formal and informal rules for how a message should be composed as well as how the processes should run. An essential EDIFACT rule is that existing standardised messages and message elements should be used as far as possible when defining new ones. This implies that in order to make lab standards, one also has to be familiar with standards within virtually all other sectors as well. The effect, seemingly unanticipated, is that it preserves and professionalises the mafia's control over the process.
In addition, the tendency within EDIFACT to emphasise the technical aspects delegates an even less central role to end-users. The specification of the data format used in the first proprietary systems literally fits on one page of paper and is easily understood by those who need it. The specification of the European standardised EDIFACT message, however, is a voluminous document of 500 (!) pages (ref CEN 1994a (ref CEN , 1994b . Where this message is used, the information exchanged is almost exactly the same as when using the old systems (CEN 1992b (CEN , 1993a (CEN , 1993b  KITH 1994)! The bias in lab communication standardisation towards the technical and general issues at the expense of the practical is shared by other EDIFACT efforts as documented by the evaluation of the European Union´s programme on diffusion of EDI in the trade sector, the TEDIS programme (Graham et al. 1996) . In this sense, the bureacratic and procedural arrangements of EDIFACT inscribe few and only indirect opportunities for user influence.
Compared to modern programming language constructs, the EDIFACT syntax is quite primitive.
These shortcomings inscribe centralised control and barriers to flexible appropriation to local technologies than EDIFACT opposed this. Among these was a group consisting of just a few persons being involved in the Euclides project under the first, preparatory phase of the European Union's health care telematics programme.
The Euclides project developed a prototype of a system for lab report exchange based on their own non-standard format. After the project was completed, a company was set up in Belgium to continue the work. Being a European Union project, Euclides was well known in the European networks which the CEN work was a part of. As the CEN work was financed by the European Union, the Euclides project was perceived as more important and relevant than its size and achievements would imply. An additional, important factor was the fact that the head of the health care committee of CEN (TC 251), George De Moor, was also the manager of the Euclides project.
The Euclides group realised that they would not succeed in trying to make their format and message the only European standard. Accordingly, they made an alliance with the information modelling approach, proposing to develop an information model for lab first, and that this model would be the primary standard. Based on this model the information could be exchanged using EDIFACT as well as other formats. This proposal was inherited from earlier Medix work, channelled to CEN by former Medix people. As more countries participated in the health care committee of CEN (TC 251) than the EMEDI group, it was decided to adopt the information modelling approach instead of modifying the EDIFACT message approved by EMEDI. This work was extended by a specification for how information should be exchanged using EDI-FACT. To our knowledge, how to exchange the information using Euclides or other messages or formats have not been specified In this process of searching for technologies as powerful allies, these were found among the general and well established ones. As EDIFACT was gaining momentum in Norway as well as Europe at this time (early 90s), EDIFACT -together with the most closely aligned standardisation bodies -did occupy centre stage. The strategy first adopted by Dr. Fürst's laboratory (accumulating practical experience from various contexts of use within the health care sector) was abandoned in favour of a strategy focusing on modelling techniques. This did not inscribe definite programs of action, but it did inscribe a shift in the delegation of competence about health care to competence in software engineering. This delay of gaining practical experience by aligning with international standardisation bodies inscribed fewer and less direct channels for enduser input from the health care sector.
EDIFACT as actor
Having reached the state where a large network was aligned around EDIFACT, we will now look more closely at the programs of action inscribed into this technology. Additionally, we consider how these inscriptions and the EDIFACT network are maintained. It is crucial to recognise that EDIFACT is not a self-contained piece of technology. It is a heterogeneous actor-network which includes: syntax for defining data structures; tools like converters and data bases for definitions development of a product paying less attention to standardisation and rather more to the experiences with existing systems.
Fearnley Data decided that their product should follow standards as far as possible. When they started, no formal decision about Norwegian or international standards had been made. However, a "rough consensus" 1 had been reached that EDIFACT should be the basis for the exchange of structured form-like information. Accordingly, Fearnley Data considered it safe to start the implementation of an EDIFACT based solution. One of their employees, Edgar Glück (educated as a doctor, practising as a systems designer) designed a first version of a lab report message in EDIFACT based on the Health Level 7 message. Fearnley Data's strategy was to install their solutions for communication between hospital labs and general practitioners' offices in parallel with promoting the message as a proposed standard within national and international bodies. This strategy turned out to be very successful. The existence of a specified message and "running code" had similar effects as Dr. Fürst's system. As Fearnley Data had one of the very rare existing EDIFACT implementations, they were highly successful in mobilising support for their solution.
Having a concrete solution, as opposed to merely playing with paper sketches, proved to be an effective way of enrolling others. With minor changes the message was accepted by both KITH and EMEDI. EMEDI sent the message specification to the Western European EDIFACT Board as a proposal for a message being formally approved by the international EDIFACT standardisation authorities. The message was quickly approved. When CEN started their work on lab reports, some proposals existed already. For this reason, they wanted to build upon one of these (CEN 1991). They hoped the message specification worked out by Edgar Glück and approved by European Medical EDI could be proposed as a pre-standard. If so, a pre-standard for lab information could be ready already in April 1992.
There was a great pressure for producing results rapidly. However, groups allied with other At this time they had given up the Health Level 7 based standardisation approach because EDI-FACT was gaining momentum. They decided to ally with EDIFACT rather than Health Level 7.
They furthermore aligned with other standardisation bodies and activities, including European Medical EDI, KITH and Statskonsult. At the same time, another company (Profdoc) started the Telenor a very influential actor within information infrastructure standardisation in Norway in the 80s.
Technology as ally
As there was a general consensus -the interests were aligned -about the need for standards, the fight about what these standards should look like and how they should be developed started.
This race was a seemingly neutral and technical discussion about which technology fitted the needs best. In reality, however, it was a race between different actors trying to manoeuvre themselves into key positions as "gatekeepers" or "obligatory passage points" (Latour 1987). In this race, most of them chose the same generic strategy, namely to first look for the technology which seemed most beneficial for them and subsequently enrolling this technology into their own actor-network as an ally. Appealing to the symbolic character of, technology makes it possible to disguise non-technical interests as technical arguments. We will here present some actors and how their they were selecting technologies as allies or strategic partners. In addition to the information model, protocols and formats to be used had to be specified. In Our approach is pragmatic. We present an emerging picture of information infrastructure standardisation based on the empirical material at hand but adjusting it as more experience with information infrastructures is acquired. Although all the EDI standards we consider in section 5
are not in ordinary, widespread use, there is some practical experience with using them. They exhibit a number of salient features of information infrastructure standardisation.
Inscriptions in standards
We now turn to a more detailed exploration of inscriptions in standards by focusing on one case, the development of standards and infrastructures in Norway for information exchange between different institutions like general practitioner offices, hospitals, laboratories, pharmacies and social insurance offices. The work in Norway was, and still is, closely linked to international standardisation. Accordingly, our case can be read as an example of a more general situation as well.
The process of inscribing programs of action into standards is illustrated by focusing on the stan- Standardisation of lab communication was quickly and strongly aligned with activities at an international level while the prescription efforts were basically situated in Norway and only weakly aligned with international ones. Our case is presented basically by unwrapping the process as it unfolds historically over the years from the late 80s up till today. We pay attention to the four aspects of inscriptions outlined in section 2, especially illustrating the wide range of technical and non-technical materials for inscriptions. One technical material we study closely is the overall standardisation model which was adopted, namely EDIFACT. We outline the translation process leading to this decision as well as its role in the subsequent translations. We also illustrate inscriptions into non-technical materials like standardisation bodies, the organisation of the standardisation activities and the procedures for standardisation.
Constructing the need for open standards
There were several, alternative standardisation and information infrastructure development strategies, or models, promoted originally. These models are all more or less based on deepseated convictions about how technology development takes place. They inscribe quite different spheres of authoritative competence and steps to proceed in the design. The range of technically
Methodological issues
Studying the development of information infrastructures is not straightforward. There are at least two reasons for this which have immediate methodological implications worth reflecting upon.
First, the size of an information infrastructure makes detailed studies of all elements practically prohibitive. Internet, for instance, consists of an estimated 10 million nodes with an unknown number of users, more than 200 standards which have, and still are, extended and modified over a period of 25 years within a large, geographically dispersed organisation where also a number of vendors (Sun, IBM, Microsoft), commercial interests (MasterCard, Visa) and consortia (W3) attempt to exercise influence. This implies that the notion of an actor in connection with information infrastructure standardisation is a fairly general one in the sense that it is sometimes an individual, a group, an organisation or a governmental institution. An actor may also be a technological artifact -small and simple or a large system or network like Internet or EDIFACT.
Actor network theory has a scalable notion of an actor as Callon and Latour (1981, p. 286) explain: "[M]acro-actors are micro-actors sitting on top of many (leaky) black boxes". In other words, actor network theory does not distinguish between a macro-and micro-actor because opening one (macro) black-box, there is always a new actor-network. It is not a question of principle but of convenience, then, which black-boxes are opened and which are not. To account for information infrastructure standardisation within reasonable space limits, it is necessary to rely on such a scalable notion of an actor. A systematic, comprehensive empirical study is prohibitive.
In our study, we have opened some, but far from every, black-box. Several black-boxes have been left unopened for different reasons: some due to constraints on writing space, some due to lack of data access and some due to constraints on research resources. It might be desirable to have opened more black-boxes than we have done. We believe, however, we have opened enough to be able to present a reasonable picture of standardisation. Our empirical evidence is drawn from standardisation of EDI messages within the health care sector in Norway. A method of historical reconstruction from reports, minutes and standards documents together with semi-and unstructured interview has been employed, partly based on (Pedersen 1996). One of the authors was for a period of three years engaged in the development of the standards by two of the companies involved (Telenor and Fearnley Data). Our account of the case has been presented, discussed and validated with one of the key actors (KITH, Norwegian: Kompetansesenteret for IT i Helsesektoren A/S).
Second, the fact that information infrastructures are currently being developed and established implies that there is only limited material on about the practical experience with which solutions "survive" and which "die", i.e. which inscriptions are actually strong enough to enforce the desired pattern of use. Hence, we are caught in a dilemma. On the one hand, the pressure for grounding an empirical study suggests that we need to await the situation, let the dust settle before inquiring closer. On the other hand, we are strongly motivated by a desire to engage in the incredible slow -design as well as diffusion (Graham et al. 1996 ). An evaluation of EDIFACT on behalf of the United Nations concludes similarly (UN 1996).
Research on standardisation
Our approach to the study of standardisation resembles those applied by Marc Berg, Geoffrey As we see it, standards and standardisation are key elements and processes in the realisation of the envisioned information infrastructures. This is a task raising a wide range of new challenges, challenges we will not be able to deal with properly without extensive research -to which we try to give a modest contribution through this paper. It seems as if this view is shared by a growing number of scholars, and some research is appearing, for instance analysis of standardisation 
Information infrastructure for health care
Health information infrastructure is use of an information infrastructure within the health care sector. It has evolved over a period of ten years and takes different shapes over time. Its two main types are transmission of form-like information and (possibly real-time) multi-media information. Illustrations of the former include: lab orders and reports exchanged between general practitioners, hospitals or labs and (other) labs; admission and discharge letters between general practitioners, specialists, and hospitals; prescriptions from general practitioners to pharmacies; exchange of non-medical information like ordering of equipment and food and invoices from hospitals and general practitioners to health insurance offices for reimbursement. Illustrations of the latter type include: telemedicine services, that is, computer based services which usually include real time multi-media conferencing systems supporting a physician requesting advise from another physician at another institution; access to data bases and Web servers containing medical information; and PACS (picture achieve systems for X-rays) systems. In this paper, we focus on the former type, i.e. transmission of form-like information.
The various forms of information exchange are overlapping and interconnected. The same piece of information may be exchanged as part of different transactions, for instance, by transmission of a digital X-ray image either using a multi-media conference system or attached in an e-mail. The development of health information infrastructure standards -not to mention their implementation in products and adoption by user organisations -has been slow. Based on personal experience, it seems that the more formal the standardisation process is, the slower the adoption becomes. Industrial consortia seem so far to be most successful. As, to the best of our knowledge, there does not exit any systematic evaluation, this is difficult to document. But studies in other sectors than health care exist. The evaluation of the European Union's program for diffusion of EDI in trade, the TEDIS programme, lend support to the view that formal standardisation is lishing. These new services subsequently accumulate pressure for new development of the information infrastructure to accommodate them.
There exist today a number of embryonic manifestations of the information infrastructures.
Internet will perhaps by most of us be considered a global information infrastructure providing general purpose services that may be used as they are or as a basis for building more specific, application dependent services. For many years, we have had application specific networks. 
Standards and standardisation processes
One normally distinguishes between de facto, de jure and formal standardisation (Schmidt and These three institutions organise the process of standardisation quite differently along several important dimensions including: the way participation in the process is regulated, how voting procedures are organised, the requirements proposed standards have to meet at different stages in the process, the manner information about ongoing standardisation is made public, and the bureacratic arrangements of how work on one, specific standard is aligned with other efforts. For and which inscriptions were needed to achieve a given aim. To exemplify, consider what it takes to establish a specific work routine. One could, for instance, try to inscribe the routine into required skills through training. Or, if this inscription was too weak, one could inscribe the routine into a textual description in the form of manuals. Or, if this still is too weak, one could inscribe the work routines by supporting them by an information system. Hence, through a process of translation, one and the same work routine may be attempted inscribed into different materials. By adding and linking these inscriptions they accumulate strength. Latour (1991) provides an illuminating illustration of this aspect of actor network theory. It is an example intended for pedagogic purposes. Hotels, from the point of view of management, want to ensure that the guests leave their keys at the front desk when leaving. The way this objective may be accomplished, according to actor network theory, is to inscribe the desired pattern of behaviour into an actor-network. The question then becomes how to inscribe it and into what. This is impossible to know for sure before hand, so management had to make a sequence of trials to test the strength of different inscriptions. In Latour's story, management first tried to inscribe it into an artifact in the form of a sign behind the counter requesting all guests to return the key when leaving. This inscription, however, was not strong enough. Then they tried having a manual door-keeper -with the same result. Management then inscribed it into a key with a metal knob of some weight. By stepwise increasing the weight of the knob, the desired behaviour was finally achieved. Hence, through a succession of translations, the hotels' interest were finally inscribed into a network strong enough to impose the desired behaviour on the guests.
In the analysis in section 6.3 we discuss various extensions of the minimalistic version of actor network theory presented here. Still, there are four aspects of the notions of inscription and translation which are particularly relevant and which we emphasise in our study: (i) the identification of explicit anticipations (or scenarios) of use held by the various actors during design (that is, standardisation), (ii) how these anticipations are translated and inscribed into the standards (that is, the materials of the inscriptions), (iii) who inscribes them and (iv) the strength of these inscriptions, that is, the effort it takes to oppose or work around them.
Standardisation and the building of information infrastructure
Information infrastructure
The notion of information infrastructure as well as basically synonymous terms like info-bahn, information or electronic highways, is elusive. It is currently receiving a considerable amount of attention from academics, politicians and the public. It is fairly safe to expect that future information infrastructure will consist of an elaboration, extension and combination of existing computer networks with associated services (Smarr and Catlett 1992). It is likely to consist of an interconnected collection of computer networks, but with a heterogeneity, size and complexity extending beyond what exists today. New services will be established, for instance, by developing today's more experimentally motivated services like video-on-demand and electronic pub-stance where artefacts determine the use and, on the other hand, a subjectivistic stance holding that an artefact is always interpreted and appropriated flexibly, the notion of an inscription may be used to describe how concrete anticipations and restrictions of future patterns of use are involved in the development and use of a technology. Akrich (1992, p. 208, emphasis added) explains the notion of inscription in the following way:
Designers thus define actors with specific tastes, competences, motives, aspirations, political prejudices, and the rest, and they assume that morality, technology, science, and economy will evolve in particular ways. A large part of the work of innovators is that of "inscribing" this vision of (or prediction about) the world in the technical content of the new object. (...) The technical realization of the innovator's beliefs about the relationship between an object and its surrounding actors is thus an attempt to predetermine the settings that users are asked to imagine (...).
Stability and social order, according to actor network theory, are continually negotiated as a social process of aligning interests. As actors from the outset have a diverse set of interests, stability rests crucially on the ability to translate, that is, re-present or appropriate, others' interests to one's own. In other words, with a translation one and the same interest or anticipation may be presented in two different ways thereby mobilising broader support. A translation presupposes a medium or a "material into which it is inscribed", that is, translations are "embodied in texts, Examples of the former are tools, the hammer being a classic example, and the assembly line of Chaplin's "Modern times" a standard illustration of the latter.
Inscriptions are given a concrete content because they represent interests inscribed into a material. The flexibility of inscriptions vary, some structure the pattern of use strongly, others weakly.
The strength of inscriptions, whether they must be followed or can be avoided, depends on the irreversibility of the actor-network they are inscribed into. It is never possible to know before hand, but by studying the sequence of attempted inscriptions we learn more about exactly how Hence, there can hardly be said to be a lack of suggestions for suitable theoretical frameworks (Kling 1991; Monteiro and Hanseth 1995). We will, however, introduce yet another one, actor network theory, which we believe will bring us one step further towards a more detailed under- Our principal aim is to uncover more of the socio-technical problems of establishing an information infrastructure. We are particularly concerned with how any given element of an information infrastructure constrains others, that is, how it "inscribes" a certain pattern use. Some of these inscriptions are in technical components, notably the different kinds and levels of communication standards. Such inscriptions (attempt to) pre-determine the pattern of use of the standards.
Other inscriptions are of a highly non-technical nature, for instance, the bureacratic organisation and procedures for working out international standards. The different bureacratic arrangements, for instance, inscribe distinct opportunities and mechanisms for user input. Both the technical and the non-technical inscriptions need to be considered together when establishing an information infrastructure. By studying the process of aligning and linking inscriptions, we also hope to learn more about their strengths, i.e. the degree to which an inscription actually succeeds in enforcing a desired behaviour.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows: The theoretical framework used, actor-network theory, borrowed from the field of science and technology studies, is outlined in section 2.
Section 3 deals with the development of general purpose information infrastructures. It delineates the notion of information infrastructure, sketches the organisation of the international standardisation processes, defines health information infrastructure and briefly reviews relevant research on standardisation. Section 4 considers methodological issues relevant to our study.
Given the fact that the object of our study is rather big (often global) and currently in-the-making, our study has made a number of pragmatically motivated approximations. Section 5 presents the case of standardisation of health information infrastructure focusing on transmission of lab orders and reports together with prescriptions. Lab communication evolves at an international level, prescriptions largely on a national one. Section 6 discusses the picture of information infrastructure standardisation which emerges through our study as well as possible implications for actor network theory. Section 7 offers a few concluding remarks.
Inscribing organisational behaviour in technology
The relationship between technology and society may be conceptualised in many ways. Two extreme end points of a continuum of alternatives are, on the one hand, technological determinism holding that the development of technology follows its own logic and that the technology determine its use (Winner 1977) and, on the other hand, social reductionism or constructionism (Woolgar 1991), (which comes close to technological somnabulism (Pfaffenberger 1988; Winner 1977)) holding that society and its actors develop the technology it "wants" and use it as they want, implying that technology in itself plays no role. A series of Braverman inspired studies appeared in the late 70s and early 80s biased towards a technological determinist position arguing that the use of IT was but the latest way of promoting management's interests regarding deskilling and control of labour (Sandberg 1979) . Later, a number of studies belonging close to the social constructivist end of the continuum were produced which focused on diversity of use
Introduction
The technical basis for an information infrastructure is the standards which regulate the communicative patterns. These standards are currently negotiated, developed and shaped through complex social processes. They embody inter-organisational changes in the specific way they regulate the communicative patterns. This implies that the organisation of the standardisation activities, usually through a variety of formal standardisation bodies, deserves closer scrutiny because it is an important -but neglected -element of the social process through which organisational networks are transformed.
Establishing a working information infrastructure is a highly complex socio-technical task which at least includes: designing a large collection of communication standards, testing and adapting these to a wide range of different use situations, and ensuring that the standards are developed according to the bureacratic procedures of international standardisation bodies. The challenges involved in making standards have so far been significantly underestimated and benefits exaggerated, generating a considerable level of frustration (Graham et al. 1996 ; UN 1996; Williams 1997).
